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Hyman Minsky considered economics serious business. Many post-World War II economists have
demonstrated little interest in contributing to the resolution of social problems. But Minsky's aim was always a
more humane economy as a first step toward a better society. In his view, practical problem solving, not
abstract puzzle solving, was the fundamental purpose of economic scholarship.
Minsky also believed that economics provided no easy answers. As a careful student of both theory and
history, he knew that neither provided strong evidence for relying on markets alone to produce prosperity and
economic stability. Making Minsky's search for practical answers even more difficult was the fact that during
his career the U.S. economics profession was dominated by neoclassical theory--an approach he rejected as an
inadequate starting point for economic analysis. In fact, reflecting on the fact that neoclassicalism was
thoroughly entrenched in the nation's advisory and policy making circles, he once wrote, "Nobody 'up there'
understands American capitalism" (Minsky 1982, 202).1
In an attempt to enable "economists and policymakers to do better," Minsky developed a Wall Street paradigm,
a financial theory of investment, and an investment theory of business cycles--the latter of which is often called
the financial instability hypothesis (FIH) (Minsky 1982, xii). These contributions, and his subsequent writings
on the secular dimension of the FIH, have all received significant attention in recent years.2 What has gone
almost entirely unnoticed, however, is that Minsky explored an even broader historical framework during the
last decade of his life. The product of those explorations--what can be called Minsky's theory of capitalist
development--is the focus of the present paper.
The paper begins by describing the purposes behind Minsky's exploration of a theory of capitalist
development. His theory is then outlined, both in terms of its essential elements and as it applies to the U.S.
economy. A concluding section identifies directions for future research.
THE NEED FOR THEORY
An atheoretical outlook did not accompany Minsky's problem-solving orientation and rejection of neoclassical
economics. In fact, Minsky had a number of reasons to engage in a theoretical examination of capitalism's
development.
Minsky believed that effective policymaking requires an understanding of the dynamics of an accumulating
capitalist economy. Since such dynamics include both short-term macroeconomic fluctuations and longer-term
economic evolution, Minsky saw the need for developing theories to improve our understanding of each (Ferri
and Minsky 1991, 24; Ferri and Minsky 1989, p. 124; Minsky 1993a). For Minsky, fashioning and updating
such theories was the mission of Post-Keynesian theory.
Beyond the perennial need for useful theories to guide policy, Minsky saw a growing immediate need for
Post-Keynesian theory in the 1980s. This need was mandated by decades of financial innovation and economicchange (Minsky 1986a). By the early 1990s, Minsky had become thoroughly convinced that institutional
reform was essential within both the financial system and the broader economy. As he wrote in 1991, "To
create a worthy successor to the financial system that served us so well between the 1930s and 1980s requires
a deeper look at our institutions than we have taken so far" (Minsky 1991a, 16). Since Minsky saw the need
for nothing less than a thorough re-examination of "our current model of capitalism," he found the most
effective way to obtain this "deeper look" was to focus on long-term capitalist development rather than
business cycles (Minsky 1993b, 1; Ferri and Minsky 1991; Minsky 1993a, 113; Minsky 1996a).
Still another reason for devising and utilizing such an alternative to neoclassical theory in the early 1990s was a
desire to stress the flawed nature of unregulated macroeconomic activity. In the two years leading up to the
Republican takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives, there was a growing dismissal of counter-cyclical
macroeconomic management within academic and policy circles. And this sentiment became even stronger after
the 1994 election. In this period, Minsky thought it was essential to combat the dominant trend with an analysis
grounded in history and institutional reality. His analyses focused on the decades before and after the New
Deal and stressed that unregulated markets are inherently unstable and can produce an intolerable distribution
of income (Minsky 1993b; Levy Institute 1994, 13-14; Minsky 1995a; Minsky 1996b).
Yet another reason for Minsky's exploration of capitalist development was to stress that capitalism can come in
many varieties--varieties with varying implications for stability, efficiency and the distribution of market power.
This fact was seen as an essential starting point not only for U.S. economic reconstruction but also for
societies that sought to move from planned to market economies (Minsky 1991b; Minsky 1992). As Minsky
argued, "Whereas all capitalisms are flawed, not all capitalisms are equally flawed" (Minsky 1986b, 295).
Finally, Minsky's broad examination of capitalist development provided an opportunity to consider the
important links between various contemporary economic issues. While much of his work focused on the
financial system, his analyses also explored the challenge of resource creation, economic insecurity, and tax
reform. The message was unmistakable: specific policy areas should not be addressed in isolation--economists
must be able to provide policymakers with a conception of the economy as an interrelated system (Ferri and
Minsky 1991, 10; Minsky 1991a, 15-16; Minsky 1993b; Minsky 1996a; Minsky and Whalen 1996-97).
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
Minsky believed there was merit to standing on the shoulders of an intellectual giant. Writing on business
cycles, Minsky made considerable use of the prior work of Keynes. In the mid-1980s, though, he became
convinced that the structure of the U.S. economy had so fundamentally changed that an analysis of structural
evolution was essential. It was at this point that Minsky turned to the insights of Schumpeter. In a 1986 essay,
Minsky (1986c, 121) wrote: "The task confronting economics today may be characterized as a need to
integrate Schumpeter's vision of a resilient intertemporal capitalist process with Keynes' hard insights into the
fragility introduced into the capitalist accumulation process by some inescapable properties of capitalist
financial structures."
Minsky believed that such an integration was possible because Schumpeter and Keynes (along with Marx and
the institutionalists) had a common perception of the task of economics: "they each define the problem that
economic theory must explain as the path of development of an accumulating capitalist economy through
historical time" (Minsky 1986b, 285). From this perspective, the economy is a complex, time-dependent
system. Society is an "evolutionary beast," changing in response to endogenous factors, not an equilibrium
seeking and sustaining system (Ferri and Minsky 1991; Minsky 1993a, 104).
If the first element in Minsky's theory is the focus on economic activity as a process in time, then the second
element is that capitalist dynamics can take many forms. The path of the economy through time can be
progressive, stagnant or deteriorating--and tranquil or turbulent. In fact, it may be highly irregular--even
chaotic.3
A fundamental determinant of the particular path of capitalist development is the economy's institutional
structure. It is this structure that facilitates, influences, regulates and constrains economic activity. In
recognition of the range of structures found throughout history, Minsky often stated that "capitalism comes inas many varieties as Heinz has pickles."4 Moreover, given the notion of the economy as an evolving system,
Minsky also stressed the dynamic nature of the institutional structure.
While standard economic theory emphasizes exchange, Minsky's recognition of historical time caused him to
emphasize that production precedes exchange--and that finance precedes production. Thus, credit and finance
are at the center of capitalist development. Moreover, "Because credit is essential to the process of development,
a theory of economic development needs to integrate money into its basic formulation." The result is an
approach inconsistent with Walrasian theory: "Monetary factors cannot be added on after a prior or dominant
model has determined the basic output and relative price variables" (Minsky 1990a, 55).
So far it has been suggested that "the in-place financial structure is a central determinant of the behavior of a
capitalist economy" (Minsky 1993a, 106). Yet another essential element in Minsky's theory is the driving force
of the profit motive. This motive was an essential element in Minsky's writings throughout his career. He had
long argued that present and prospective profits influence economic activity within the context of a given
institutional structure--and that the structure itself changes in response to profit seeking. As Minsky gave
increasing attention to capitalist development, profit-driven structural change took on increasing importance in
his writings (Minsky 1986c; Ferri and Minsky 1989, 135; Minsky 1993a).
Scholars have long recognized Schumpeterian forces of creation and destruction in products and
manufacturing processes. But Minsky emphasized that Schumpeter also gave attention to changes in financial
systems. As a result, Minsky's theory stresses that financial markets evolve not only in response to
profit-driven demands of business leaders and individual investors but also as a result of the profit-seeking
entrepreneurialism of financial firms (Minsky 1986b; Minsky 1990a; Minsky 1993a). In fact, Minsky wrote:
"Nowhere is evolution, change and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship more evident than in banking and finance
and nowhere is the drive for profits more clearly the factor making for change" (Minsky 1993a, 106). In short,
financial innovation is another essential element in Minsky's theory--indeed, such innovation is a crucial
determinant of institutional evolution.5
To summarize, capitalist development is shaped by the institutional structure, but this structure is always
evolving in response to profit-seeking activity. The financial system takes on special importance in this theory
not only because finance exerts a strong influence on business activity but also because this system is
particularly prone to innovation. Since finance and industrial development are in a symbiotic relation, financial
evolution plays a crucial role in the dynamic patterns of the economy.
There is, however, one more essential element of Minsky's theory: public policy. Government action is an
inescapable determinant of capitalist economic development. Its decisions shape the institutional framework
that conditions economic activity.
As U.S. economic experience has shown since 1933, discretionary policy interventions and institutional
containing mechanisms can both be utilized to promote economic stability. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy
(Minsky's "big government") and lender-of-last-resort monetary initiatives have been among the most potent
stabilizers employed in the past half century.6 But financial- and labor-market regulations have also played
contributing roles. As Minsky indicated in Stabilizing an Unstable Economy , "policy influences both the
details and overall character of the economy." Thus, economists and policymakers "must be concerned with the
design of institutions as well as with operation within a set of institutions" (Minsky 1986a, 7, 293; Ferri and
Minsky 1991; Delli Gatti, Gallegati and Minsky 1996; Minsky 1996a).
Since the economy evolves endogenously, no policy regime will provide a "once-and-for-all solution" to
economic difficulties. In time, policies that once worked well may no longer be adequate due to innovations in
finance and business or the emergence of new problems (Minsky 1986a, 293). While Minsky recognized it is
neither possible nor desirable for policymakers to engage constantly in institutional reform, he stressed that
such change becomes essential when inadequate economic performance becomes widely evident and deemed
serious by the public and its representatives (Minsky 1986a, 5).7
U.S. CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENTThe history of economic thought contains a variety of theories of capitalist development. Some recent theories
are efficiency-driven. Other theories focus on technology, product innovation, or class struggle. Minsky's
theory is finance-driven, and the relations between finance and business are given center stage. Key questions
to be asked at each stage are: what is being financed, and what is the pivotal source of financing?
A consideration of Minsky's theory as it applies to U.S. economic history provides evidence that capitalism
does indeed come in many varieties. At least five stages can be identified — and we might now be on the verge
of creating a sixth. The five stages can be labeled as follows: merchant capitalism (1607-1813), industrial
capitalism (1813-1890), banker capitalism (1890-1933), managerial capitalism (1933-1982), and
money-manager capitalism (1982-present).8 (See Table I at the end of this paper.)
Merchant capitalism emerged from European feudal society and took root in America with establishment of
British colonies in the 1600s. Merchants dominated the economic scene until approximately 1813, when the
Boston Manufacturing Company (organized by Francis Lowell) began operating the first integrated cotton
textile factory in the United States.9 The dominant source of finance in this initial era provided funds for goods
in process, stock (inventories), or transit. The financing was provided by merchant banking ("vouching for the
legitimacy of distant trade partners" and financing goods in transit) and commercial banking (Minsky 1990a,
67; 1992, 30-31).
Merchant capitalism was characterized by owner-managed enterprises--usually proprietorships or
partnerships--with few employees and often few transactions per day (Heilbroner and Singer 1994, 62). To a
large extent, the U.S. economy was a raw-material export economy in this era. Production was by labor and
tools, rather than by machinery and labor.
A growing population and the arrival of the industrial revolution helped undermine merchant capitalism. But
Minsky is correct in drawing our attention to the profit motive, for profit was the driving force for individuals
whose names have become synonymous with the arrival and expansion of industrial capitalism (Francis
Lowell, Eli Whitney, Cyrus McCormick, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Andrew Carnegie, for example). Moreover,
innovation in finance was a prerequisite--for the banking structures of merchant capitalism were ill suited to
finance the capital development of the economy.
Industrial capitalism  was characterized by emergence of financial organizations that could mobilize the
resources needed for factory manufacturing, capital-intensive transportation, mills, and mines. This era saw
organization of the New York Stock Exchange and the rise of investment banking houses such as that of J.P.
Morgan.10 The partnership gave way to the corporation, and home production gave way to factory production.
Industrial capitalism was also a period characterized by numerous rounds of cutthroat price competition. By
threatening the financial health of industrial firms, this competition threatened the ability of corporations to
fulfill their payment commitments. Also threatened was the security of investments. Thus, many business
leaders and bankers "began to abhor competitive markets" (Minsky 1993a, 109). Morgan, for example, is
reported to have said, "I like a little competition; but I like combination better" (Heilbroner and Singer 1994,
206). Others were even less generous toward the invisible forces of the marketplace.
Banker capitalism  was the new era established when investment bankers responded to cutthroat competition
in the 1880s and 1890s. Its arrival is characterized by investment bankers turning their attention toward the
financing of industrial combinations (cartels, trusts and mergers), a trend not at all altered by the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. Indeed, there was a merger wave in its aftermath.11 "By 1904, one or two giant firms — usually
put together by merger -- controlled at least half the output in seventy-eight different industries" (Heilbroner
and Singer 1994, 208).
In the evolution from merchant capitalism to banker capitalism, private economic power had become greatly
concentrated. While the law of supply and demand was not repealed, private-sector financiers and managers
exerted their own formidable force during banker capitalism — at both the enterprises and industry levels. At
the enterprise level, "scientific" techniques devised or inspired by Frederick Winslow Taylor combined withassembly-line production and enabled managers to generate significant increases in factory output. At industry
level, meanwhile, investment bankers acquired a controlling position in the economy not only by arranging
mergers but also by securing large ownership shares and seats on the boards of directors of newly combined
corporations.
Minsky does not explain the speculative boom and collapse that brought about both the Great Depression and
the end of banker capitalism. But evidence exists that is consistent with the essential elements of his analysis
(and with his extensive writings on business cycles and secular fragility). It is said that the financial panic of
1907-08 was brought to an end when Morgan stepped in to minimize the economic losses. But his firm was
not able to repeat this achievement in 1929 (Galbraith 1961). According to Guilio Pontecorvo's landmark study
of the 1920s, investment-banking firms had become victims of their own success.
Although the years between 1908 and 1929 were not recession free, they were depression free and generally
prosperous — a sharp contrast with the American experience from 1866 through 1908. Because the U.S.
capital market was free from any significant policy constraints prior to 1933, any regulation had to come from
within the financial community. But the relative stability and prosperity attracted not only new investors but
also new investment bankers to the industry (many commercial banks, for example, formed investment banking
affiliates in the 1920s). While the older firms were more conservative in their practices, the new firms were
"aggressively engaged in expansion of their business." Moreover, close ties between some investment
companies and speculative interests meant that their policies contributed more to market instability than to
stability (Pontecorvo 1958).
Pontecorvo writes that the effect of entry into investment banking in the 1920s "was to reduce the relative
importance and the leadership role of the original firms. Furthermore, the industry developed a large
competitive fringe. This fringe of highly competitive firms had a considerable effect on the behavior of the
industry." He concludes: "The overall impact of these changes was the elimination of any internal controls that
may have been present in the earlier period. The instability in the structure created by the rise of new firms was
a factor in the security inflation that followed" (Pontecorvo 1958). In classic Minskian fashion, success bred
daring — and when the speculative bubble burst, the not even the nation's great investment banking houses
could contain the collapse.
The Depression made manifest the need for public action to stabilize economic activity in the face of business
downturns. Due to the divergence between individual and collective rationality, it was nearly impossible for
individual bankers, businesses and farmers to do anything except cut loans, slash prices, reduce employment,
and increase agricultural yields--all of which made matters worse in the aggregate. Franklin Roosevelt's answer
was the New Deal, a series of policies and reforms that ushered in the next stage of U.S. capitalist
development.
Managerial capitalism  began with bold government action in the realm of monetary policy and banking.
Through the Emergency Banking Act and other initiatives, Americans were provided with an accommodative
Federal Reserve, bank reorganizations, and institutional reform including deposit insurance, securities
regulation, and compartmentalization of financial institutions. Combined with counter-cyclical fiscal policy,
farm policies and labor-market regulations, this government action helped set the stage for an unprecedented
period of stability and prosperity after World War II.
The postwar economic environment--characterized by oligopolistic markets, insignificant foreign competition,
and government macroeconomic management--enabled U.S. corporate managers a high degree of
independence from banker and stockholder pressures. Unfortunately, as managers emphasized stability, many
neglected adaptation. The result was complacency that produced considerable economic upheaval when
inflation and intense foreign competition both appeared on the scene in the 1970s.
Another trend after World War II was the secular evolution of a more fragile financial system--as postwar
prosperity and lender-of-last-resort monetary interventions by the Fed encouraged reductions in margins of
safety, greater reliance on debt financing, and a turn toward short-term financing. In time, there was also an
explosion of activity by finance companies and other non-bank financial institutions--as well as a steady stream
of bank innovations such as the securitization of loans and the creative use of off-balance sheetcommitments.12
One major innovation in the financial system in the postwar period was the rise of managed-money
funds--pension funds, mutual funds, bank trust funds, and the like. Part of this growth was due to the spread of
private pensions as a feature of the U.S. labor market. Over time, such funds accumulated vast sums. Inflation's
damaging effect upon bank deposits also contributed to the increase in managed-money funds. As the postwar
era progressed, "individual wealth holdings increasingly took the form of ownership of the liabilities of
managed funds rather than the holding of a portfolio of the liabilities of individual businesses" (Minsky 1993a,
110-111).
Money-manager capitalism  became a reality in the 1980s as institutional investors, by then the largest
repositories of savings in the country, began to exert their influence on financial markets and business
enterprises. The aim of money managers, and the sole criterion by which they are judged, is the maximization
of the value of the investments made by fund holders. As a result, business leaders became increasingly
sensitive to short-term profits and the stock-market valuation of their firm. In the era of managerial capitalism,
corporate managers "were the masters of the private economy" (Minsky 1993a, 110). By the 1980s, money
managers were the masters.
The rise of institutional investors encouraged continued financial-system evolution by providing a ready pool
of buyers for securitized loans, the commercial paper of finance companies, and other innovations. It also
fueled the trend toward mergers, acquisitions, corporate breakups, leveraged buyouts and stock
buybacks--since fund managers have a strong incentive to support whatever initiatives promise to boost
near-term portfolio value. These managed-money funds often provided the resources that raiders needed to
secure corporate control.
Money manager pressures--often in combination with the force exerted by growing international competition
and rapid technological and product-market changes--also encouraged corporate downsizing and
re-engineering. While such changes sometimes gave remaining employees greater individual autonomy than
they had under scientific management, organizational restructuring and management re-engineering also
generated worker insecurity. In addition to job insecurity, employees (including professional workers and
managers) faced a workplace in which productivity pressures and contingent work was on the rise while many
intra-organizational job ladders and employer-provided training opportunities were being eliminated. As the
Wharton School's Peter Cappelli and a research team of distinguished U.S. scholars concluded in 1997,
employment relations under money-manager capitalism involved a rush toward treating human resources as a
cost to be minimized. Labor was seen increasingly as just other "spot market" commodity (Cappelli et al.
1997).
Throughout this period, government has continued to provide lender-of-last-resort assistance to stabilize the
overall economy. But it has also provided its own encouragement to the evolution of the financial system by
removing many regulations imposed during the New Deal. Tax law changes have also encouraged takeovers,
buyouts and other types of corporate restructuring (Wolfson 1994, 111-112).
A decade ago, Minsky observed that money-manager capitalism is global and that further international
economic integration would take place in the years ahead. Here is a sampling of his comments on these
matters:
"Managed money capitalism is international in both the funds and the assets of the funds. It has rendered
obsolete the view that trade patterns determine the short-run movement of exchange rates" (Minsky 1990a, 71).
"As the countries that are involved in managed money capitalism increase, an international division of
responsibility for maintaining global aggregate gross profits will be necessary" (Minsky 1990a, 71).
"Global financial integration is likely to characterize the next era of expansive capitalism. The problem of
finance that will emerge is whether the financial and fiscal control and support institutions of national
governments can contain both the consequences of global financial fragility and an international debt deflation"
(Minsky 1995b, 93).13 This presentation of Minsky's theory of U.S. capitalist development began with the suggestion that a sixth
economic stage might now be emerging. This suggestion comes from the fact that national and international
entities have recently sought not only to contain the recent Asia-centered global financial crisis but also to
prevent similar crises from appearing in the future (see, for example, Council of Economic Advisors 1999,
chapter 7). If the international financial architecture is indeed reformed in this way, it may soon be possible to
speak of a new era of coordinated policies and institutions that might be called "global finance capitalism."
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Economists choosing to pursue lines of research opened by Minsky's theory of capitalist development can
expect to be busy for quite some time. His ideas on capitalist development continue to guide us and challenge
us to explore important questions.
One direction for future research is to more thoroughly develop his theory as it relates to the U.S. economy.
Minsky made it clear that for each stage we should ask what is the distinctive activity being financed, what is
the pivotal source of financing, and what is the balance of economic power between those in business and
banking/finance. He also suggested that we strive to identify the essential financial, business, and policy
institutions of each era. There is still much room for scholarship on these topics and on the inter-relations of
finance and business within each stage.
Developing Minsky's theory more thoroughly might also involve explorations that begin by dividing each stage
into three periods: financial exploration and experimentation; institutionalization and diffusion of new
practices; and erosion. Providing insight into the transition from one stage to another is an important aspect of
any valuable theory of capitalist development. A deeper understanding of the U.S. economy is likely to be
achieved by fleshing out his theory in this manner.
Another possible research direction is to consider how the essential elements of his theory can be applied to
other nations. Minsky's writings offer only a few suggestions on this (see, for example, Minsky 1990a;
1991a). There is much room for fruitful research here--research with the potential not only to further human
understanding but also to help shape the continued evolution of market economies. Indeed, transitional
economies may find such scholarship particularly useful as they prepare to continue on the path from planning
to markets.
The aforementioned research avenues offer room for rigorous analysis and hypothesis testing. But there is also
room for those who are even more inclined to mathematical and conceptual explorations. In particular, through
an examination of macroeconomic models such scholars can follow Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati
and Minsky in exploring the role of alternative institutional constraints on economic activity (Delli Gatti,
Gallegati, and Minsky 1996).
Yet another research possibility involves taking Minsky's theory of the U.S. as a point of departure for any of a
number of specific questions with contemporary policy significance. For example:
How can technological dynamism be sustained in the era of money-manager capitalism (or its
successor, if recent trends indeed warrant us to think in terms of a successor)? Can the private sector
alone promote advanced technology? If not, what should be the role for government (Minsky 1990a,
72)?14 
How can policymakers promote a level of private (and public) resource creation consistent with full
employment and reasonable economic growth (Minsky 1986b, 294)? (In part, answering this question
requires considering whether the economy is better served by financial institutions that are centralized
or decentralized, and are broad or compartmentalized (Minsky 1992, 37). 
What are the likely effects of alternative policies on inflation, macroeconomic stability, efficiency, and
economic security (Minsky 1986b, 295)?15 
Does the pension fund system--and the wider social security and retirement system--need to be
overhauled? Should policy induce a shift to defined contribution schemes? Can/should open-ended
IRAs be used to attenuate the power of pension funds? Should the income tax be transformed into aspending tax (Minsky 1992, 34-35)? 
How can the business need for profits be balanced with both the household need for security through
time and the economy's need for capital development (Minsky 1991a, 16; Minsky 1996a)? 
How should the global financial system be structured to promote growth and contain instability
(Minsky 1995b, 93; Minsky 1990b)? 
In short, Minsky's theory of capitalist development provides the foundation for a comprehensive research
program. Minsky started with a commonsense suggestion--that policy would be more apt if it reflected an
understanding of the economy as an evolving entity. From this he constructed a formidable alternative to the
neoclassical paradigm.
Ten years ago, Minsky thought that the present would be an exciting time for economists--at least for those
who took as their starting point the idea that economic behavior leads to unstable dynamics. As usual, he was
right. Yes, Minsky considered economics serious business. But he also saw it as a subject of thrilling interests,
not a dismal science.16 Economics in the twenty-first century will be whatever we make it. Fortunately, we can
stand on the shoulders of a giant. Minsky will continue to guide and challenge us for many years to come.
  NOTES
1. During Minsky's last public lecture, he stated: "In the neoclassical school, even in its most modern
forms, it is not clear that the economy under analysis is capitalist" (Minsky 1996a, 362). 
2.  For more on what I call the "secular dimension" of Minsky's FIH, see Whalen (1997, 518). 
3.  Chaotic behavior involves a complex, nonlinear time path (Ferri and Minsky 1991, 8). 
4.  This is a reference to the Heinz slogan, "57 varieties." 
5.  On financial innovation, Minsky (1993a, 106-107) writes: "To understand the short-term dynamics of
the business cycle and the longer-term evolution of economies it is necessary to understand the
financing relations that rule, and how the profit-seeking activities of businessmen, bankers and
portfolio managers lead to the evolution of financial structures. . . Consumer sovereignty is
subordinated to the vision of entrepreneurs and the critical analysis of bankers in determining the path
of the economy." 
6.  Drawing on Schumpeter, Minsky (1990a, 56) notes that the banker/financier is the "ephor"
(controlling figure) of a market economy, and that the central bank is the ephor of the ephor. 
7.  Since policy interventions in the economy are the product of political processes, Minsky stresses that
the path through time of an economy is a "political economy phenomenon" (Ferri and Minsky 1989,
138). 
8.  Minsky calls merchant capitalism and banker capitalism "commercial capitalism" and "financial
capitalism," respectively. For me, the former labels (borrowed from John R. Commons) are slightly
more descriptive. For Minsky's most detailed discussions of these stages, see Minsky (1990a; 1992;
1993a). Elements of this analysis are also discussed in Minsky (1990b; 1991a; 1996a) and Minsky
and Whalen (1996-97); see also Whalen (1997). The present section (U.S. Capitalist Development) is
based on these references. 
9.  Lowell's factory was "integrated" in that "the plant both spun cotton and thread and wove it into cloth
by machine" (Heilbroner and Singer 1994, 109). 
10.  Investment banking houses, working in securities markets, were the dominant financial institutions of
this era. Investment bankers "acted as brokers when they facilitated trade in existing [stock and bond]
issues and as dealers when they underwrote new issues" (Minsky 1993a, 108-109). 
11.  Between 1892 and 1902, for example, J.P. Morgan played an instrumental role in arranging mergers
that created General Electric, American Telephone and Telegraph, International Harvester, and United
States Steel Corporation (Heilbroner and Singer 1994, 206). 
12.  The reader will note it is here that the secular dimension of Minsky's FIH connects with his theory of
capitalist development. 
13.  In contrast, neoclassical economists did not foresee the Asian financial crisis and had little to offer
when it occurred. As Paul Krugman (1998, 23) wrote on the Asian crisis in October 1998, "Suppose
that you were to buy a copy of the best-selling textbook on international economics. What would it tellyou about how to cope with such a sudden loss of confidence by international investors? Well, not
much." He then added: "Trust me--I'm the co-author of that textbook." 
14.  Minsky was concerned that "the emergence of money-manager capitalism means that the financing of
the capital development of the economy has taken a back seat to the quest for short-run total returns"
(Minsky 1992, 32; see also Minsky 1993a, 113). He was particularly concerned that the capital needs
of advanced technology development would be passed over by the private sector (Minsky 1990a, 72). 
15.  Minsky (1992, 36) believed better coordination is needed between the macroeconomic impact of
government spending, which promotes the conditions that sustain profit flows, and the microeconomic
impact of such spending, "which creates the conditions conducive to private resource creation and
progressive enterprise." 
16.  I borrow the alternatives of "a subject of thrilling interests" and 'a dismal science' from Wesley
Mitchell. 
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